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Abstract
Revenue management (RM) is a complicated business process that can best be described as
control of sales (using prices, restrictions, or capacity), usually using software as a tool to aid
decisions. RM software can play a mere informative role, supplying analysts with formatted and
summarized data who use it to make control decisions (setting a price or allocating capacity for
a price point), or, play a deeper role, automating the decisions process completely, at the other
extreme. The RM models and algorithms in the academic literature by and large concentrate
on the latter, completely automated, level of functionality.
A rm considering using a new RM model or RM system needs to evaluate its performance.
Academic papers justify the performance of their models using simulations, where customer
booking requests are simulated according to some process and model, and the revenue perfor-
mance of the algorithm compared to an alternate set of algorithms. Such simulations, while
an accepted part of the academic literature, and indeed providing research insight, often lack
credibility with management. Even methodologically, they are usually awed, as the simula-
tions only test \within-model" performance, and say nothing as to the appropriateness of the
model in the rst place. Even simulations that test against alternate models or competition are
limited by their inherent necessity on xing some model as the universe for their testing. These
problems are exacerbated with RM models that attempt to model customer purchase behav-
ior or competition, as the right models for competitive actions or customer purchases remain
somewhat of a mystery, or at least with no consensus on their validity.
How then to validate a model? Putting it another way, we want to show that a particular
model or algorithm is the cause of a certain improvement to the RM process compared to the
existing process. We take care to emphasize that we want to prove the said model as the cause
of performance, and to compare against a (incumbent) process rather than against an alternate
model.
In this paper we describe a \live" testing experiment that we conducted at Iberia Airlines
on a set of ights. A set of competing algorithms control a set of ights during adjacent
weeks, and their behavior and results are observed over a relatively long period of time (9
months). In parallel, a group of control ights were managed using the traditional mix of manual
and algorithmic control (incumbent system). Such \sandbox" testing, while common at many
large internet search and e-commerce companies is relatively rare in the revenue management
area. Sandbox testing has an undisputable model of customer behavior but the experimental
design and analysis of results is less clear. In this paper we describe the philosophy behind the
experiment, the organizational challenges, the design and setup of the experiment, and outline
the analysis of the results. This paper is a complement to a (more technical) related paper that
describes the econometrics and statistical analysis of the results.
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1 Introduction
Revenue management (RM) is a complicated business practice. It involves understanding industry
practices, idiosyncracies of each market, customer behavior and preferences, competition, pricing
and somehow translating all that experience, wisdom, and information into an operational practice
that consistently fetches improved revenues for the rm. In practice it is a combination of analyst
skills, managerial knowledge and clever use of data and software tools.
The RM models and algorithms in the academic literature focus on just a narrow aspect of
revenue management|the development of models that automate the analysis of the data and convert
it into inputs for models which subsequently give optimized decisions (prices or booking controls).
In practice rms rarely rely entirely on models or algorithms. A working RM system is usually
an undescribable mix of analyst decisions and automation. It is not at all clear then how a RM
algorithm, even if it is based on a complicated model, and sophisticated algorithms, would compare
to an analyst performing the same task manually based on his or her experience and knowledge of
the market.
A rm considering using a new RM model or RM system however needs to evaluate its perfor-
mance. Academic papers justify the performance of their models using simulations, where customer
booking requests are simulated according to some process and model, and the revenue performance
of the algorithm compared to an alternate set of algorithms. We argue below that a simulation
comparison against another alternate model of the universe is of little use for a rm. The sole
concern of the rm is to improve its revenues. For this reason such simulations, while an accepted
part of the academic literature, and indeed providing some research insight, often lack credibility
with management.
Even methodologically, simulations (in the RM context, and the ones in the RM literature) are
usually awed, as they only test \within-model" performance, and say nothing as to the appro-
priateness of the model in the rst place. Even simulations that test against alternate models or
models of competition are limited by their inherent necessity on xing the alternate model for their
testing. These problems are exacerbated with RM models that attempt to model customer purchase
behavior or competition, as the right models for competitive actions or customer purchases remain
somewhat of a mystery, or at least with no consensus on their validity.
How then to validate a model? We want to show causality, that is impute performance to the
new method convincingly, which is often a much more tricky exercise than showing correlation, with
controversy surrounding even the meaning of \causality" (see Granger [6]). We follow the denition
of Hart and Honor e [7]: `the cause is a dierence to the normal course which accounts for the
dierence in the outcome'.
Showing cause is perhaps the least controversial in an experimental setting, which is the main
reason we settled on the \live" testing experiment that we describe in this paper. A set of competing
algorithms control a set of ights during adjacent weeks, and their behavior and results are observed
over a relatively long period of time (9 months). In parallel, a group of control ights were managed
using the traditional mix of manual and algorithmic control (incumbent system). Such \sandbox"
testing, while common at many large internet search and e-commerce companies is relatively rare in
the revenue management area. Sandbox testing has an undisputable model of customer behavior but
the experimental design and analysis of results is less clear. In this paper we describe the philosophy
2behind the experiment, the organizational challenges, the design and setup of the experiment, and
outline the analysis of the results. Our focus is not so much on the results, the revenue performance
of the algorithms, but on how we went about justifying and analyzing the results, that we hope will
serve as guidelines for such future live testing. This paper is a complement to (a more) technical
related paper that describes the econometrics and statistical analysis of the results.
2 RM Models and Simulations
Most revenue management implementations are based on what is called the \independent class"
assumption where the demand for the dierent fare classes is independent of each other, and more
importantly, independent of the controls; the sales are assumed lost when a fare class is closed. This
is clearly a rather weak modeling of how customers purchase products, and a number of authors
have proposed revenue management using more realistic customer behavior models ([12].
As such models proliferate it is increasingly becoming an issue identifying which is the \right"
model. For us a \right" model is one that obtains the rm the most revenue when implemented.
This denition avoids judging a model by its elaborateness or complexity (for instance correlations,
or allowing dependencies etc.) or generalities, or, one's projection of own behavior or anecdotal
evidence. Operational constraints also play a role: to be implementable, a model has to be tractable
using current computing capabilities. So an apparently weak model may have as much chance as
a sophisticated model if it is more robust, can be run more frequently, or simply is better where it
matters.
Modeling customer behavior explicitly is a step in the right direction, but very few RM models in
operation (as opposed to proposed in the literature) incorporate competitive behavior. In practice
this is a \rst-order" factor. Often an analyst will set a price control solely as a response to a
competitor's action. Given the diculties of analyzing models with both consumer behavior and
competitor (three players) it is quite likely that RM algorithms will be ignoring some important
elements that make up real-world RM practice.
2.0.1 RM System objectives
In our view a RM system, apart from its broad objective of maximizing revenue, ought to have the
following characteristics
1. Controllable: analysts will know things no system will know, and hence should be able to allow
analyst input.
2. Robust: does not perform badly in any market or circumstance.
3. Adaptable: as we can never forecast certain events, or know certain data (competition controls)
the system should therefore be able to adapt (or react) well and quickly.
While RM models have a clear objective function|maximize expected revenue under a stochastic
model of demand|what they fail to capture are these \other" aspects of a good RM system. Now,
a RM implementation that has been in operation for a while, has some aspects of all the above
control, robustness and adaptability, which makes makes evaluating whether a new algorithm is
good or bad very dicult. They are also precisely some of the reasons why Monte-Carlo simulations
3do not inspire condence, as these factors are very dicult to simulate. We elaborate further below
some further diculties with RM simulations.
2.0.2 Simulations
Testing RM models then poses a problem. Traditionally, at least in the academic literature, revenue
management models and algorithms were tested using simulations. The models generating customer
requests in such simulations were more often than not, the exact same model on which the system was
based upon. Such simulations are useful for testing performance of algorithms within the connes
of a model, but do not give much information about the validity of the model itself.
Even testing based on historic data is not a reliable predictor of generalization as historic data
covers a small slice of the relevant market data. One could conceivably run simulations modeling var-
ious scenarios and models of customer and competitive behavior (and indeed we mention a few such
industry simulations later), but it still does not solve the problem of subjectivity and arbitrariness
in choosing one of the models used behind the simulations as the \right" one.
We summarize below some of the criticisms one can level against simulations:
1. Simulations are model based, and the only universally accepted model of customer behavior,
as utility maximizers, is too vague to be simulated.
2. One rarely knows what model competition uses and its objectives, so it is dicult to model
competitive reactions in a simulation.
3. Unexpected events, by denition, do not follow any model and they play a big role in dening
the performance of a RM system
4. Simulations give an unfair, and meaningless, advantage to models that coincide with the one
behind the simulations.
We have to admit on the other hand that simulations, while suering from the aforementioned
aws of arbitrariness in modeling and assumptions, have the advantage of total control over the
environment making their design and analysis relatively easy.
3 Context and motivation
The motivation for this study comes from a RM method developed by the authors that explicitly
models customer purchase behavior (with a mixture of customer types) and potential market on a
ight-date level, and also incorporates other information such as product characteristics and com-
peting oerings. A prototype was developed and rened over a period of two years (from now one
we shall refer to this method and its algorithms as prototype)1. It was at that point that we faced
the problem of convincing management on the potential benets to the rm from using this new
method on an operational basis.
Building an elaborate simulation model was not ruled out, but it was not clear (i) how to validate
such a simulation model (ii) if results from such as study would ever convince management. So
1As the point of the paper is to describe the validation of a RM method rather than the method itself, we do not
go into the details of the method.
4instead, we decided to take a calculated gamble and test it on live ights. We describe the concept
and the setup next.
3.1 Sandbox Testing
A set of competing algorithms control a set of ights, and their behavior and results are observed
over a relatively long period of time (9 months). In parallel, a group of control ights were run using
the traditional man-machine mix of manual and algorithmic control.
3.1.1 Choice of ights and markets
The objective is to choose a small set of markets. We started o with one market, but eventually
the test included ten dierent markets (city pairs). All the ights were of the point-to-point type.
The markets were chosen to be of dierent types (monopoly, traditional, low-cost competition). The
choice of the markets itself was made by the users (the analyst group). We believe it is close to
random with perhaps a bias towards the poorly performing markets, as no one is inclined to mess
with a top-performing market. Within each market the same user group chose a set of ights; a few
complete markets, that is where all the ights in the market were controlled by the test method,
were chosen (22 ights overall in one test)
3.1.2 Process
To isolate just model performance and not to get into the cost of denied boardings etc, we decided to
use the same overbooking limits for all ights in the test set. The limits were given by the incumbent
model. The process of switching back and forth between the incumbent process and the prototype
was in fact extremely easy. Figure 1 shows a schematic of the process. The incumbent system
outputs the overbooking limits and the curtain settings for the ights. Under normal operations,
the incumbent system writes to a directory and another process reads the output and uploads the
booking controls to the reservation system, and analysts view and control the settings from then on.
The new control system (prototype) is introduced into the process simply by asking the incumbent
system to write to a dierent directory and having the prototype write into the uploads directory in
the same format (and with the same overbooking limits) as the incumbent system. So the prototype
(and the other systems we eventually ended up testing this way) has the same information as the
incumbent system and both systems use the same overbooking limits (set by the incumbent system).
3.1.3 Alternating control and organizational issues
Once the process was put in place, the control for the test ights alternated between the incumbent
system and the prototype on alternate weeks. So the incumbent process (the man-machine mix)
controlled the test ights for one week (Monday to Sunday) and the prototype took over for the next
week. The prototype ran unsupervised after an initial break-in period, so it was a truly automated
solution vs. the incumbent process. The idea behind alternating control is that if we do this for a
suciently long period the dierences between weeks would be averaged out. This turned out to be
more or less true, with some exceptions as we discuss in a later section.
5Figure 1: Schematic showing the implementation of the prototype (and other methods).
6Organizationally, the biggest challenge was to prevent analysts interfering with the ights during
the period controlled by the prototype. As|at least at that stage|analysts were assigned by
markets this involved only a few analysts. From a human motivation point of view, just the fact
that their work was being tested would have clearly inuenced the performance of the analysts.
So we do not claim that the results are without the so-called \observer" bias|only that the bias
would be on the positive side; as the analysts hopefully were more alert and keen to the observation,
their performance would have improved, and hence we compare the prototype with the best of their
performance.
3.1.4 Round-trips
One relevant question in the design of the experiment was the issue of round-trips. There are going
to be customers who would purchase a ticket starting during one week (controlled by one system) and
returning another week (controlled by another system). So the sale is aected by both the systems.
Our choice of using Monday-to-Sunday was somewhat inuenced by this consideration. While one
can never eliminate these reservations, while still keeping a small inter-temporal distance between
the systems, we felt that switching over to a new control on Mondays would perhaps minimize the
eects the most. Most business customers return to their origin during the week. Moreover most of
the restricted fares have a Saturday night stay control, so the leisure customers changing their return
date would likely return to origin on the Sunday immediately following the restriction. Groups, such
as cruise-line passengers, who are most likely to depart and arrive mid-week were few in the markets
that were chosen. Events such as Easter were removed from the test, so holiday-travel that crosses
weeks was also minimal in the nal results.
3.1.5 Advantages and complications
Compared to simulations, sandbox testing has some important advantages,
1. Tests what we are looking for (revenue performance) over an extended period of time.
2. Not based on any model or assumptions.
3. Based on actual ights and markets.
4. The testing is holistic in the sense that it puts an automated model through all the real-world
factors and complications, and compares system (analysts, information) as a whole.
5. It tests the model's reaction capabilities, which is an oft-overlooked aspect of RM systems.
6. Gives a deep and fully credible understanding of what works and doesn't work in the design
of RM models.
7. Allows the R&D department to continuously improve the models and algorithms.
8. The results are tangible and believable.
Sandbox testing thus has an undisputable model of customer behavior but the experimental
design and analysis of results is less clear. Indeed what we have encountered is that all the work
that goes into building a Monte-Carlo simulation has now moved to giving careful thought about
the experiment, and in an exhaustive analysis of the results.
74 Literature Review
For the background on revenue management and dynamic pricing, we refer the readers to the books
Talluri and van Ryzin [13] and Phillips [10]. Talluri and van Ryzin [12] studied RM explicitly
modeling customer choice behavior by a tractable discrete choice model and this has led to much
recent research along these lines.
Almost every paper on revenue management presenting a new method or a variation on an
existing model or algorithm has some Monte-carlo simulations justifying the performance of the
method. Most of these simulations work within the model setting (that is, do not test out-of-
model performance). We note here however a series of simulation experiments conducted at MIT
called PODS by Belobaba et al. [1], [2]. These simulations are distinguished by the fact that
they have an explicit model of customer behavior, and moreover, in the later part of the studies,
include competition. So in eect, they are trying to study various eects of customer behavior and
competition, but the main focus there is to study the performance of the algorithms.
We are not aware of published literature that describes explicitly the kind of sandbox testing
that we describe here, but from our industry conversations, we believe that a number of airlines
would have conducted similar studies internally without publishing the results or experiments. We
believe our contribution is formalizing the experimental design and the analysis of the results.
The published literature on experimental design and statistical analysis of results in other con-
texts (especially drug testing) is of course too vast to fully describe here. Cox [3] and Cox and
Reid [4] provide much of the background statistical context for experimental design. In the language
of experimental design ours is a prospective longitudinal, or a cohort, study.
Our objective in this study is not just to conduct an experiment but also nd a causal relationship
between the experiment's results and the treatment. This is more tricky. An every statistician
knows, correlation is distinct from causality, and determining the latter is an order of magnitude
more dicult than the former. This diculty is captured by the fundamental problem of causal
inference: it is impossible to observe the eect of more than one treatment on the same unit at
the same time. In our context, this simply means we cannot control a ight on a particular day
by method A and method B at the same time. This is at the heart of our choice of a longitudinal
alternating-weeks experiment.
The literature on causality and its testing is as vast as that on experimental design. We refer the
reader to a recent survey of Pearl [9] for background material. Our approach can be said to be close
that of the Rubin's causal model of potential outcomes (Rubin [11]; see also [8]) using structural
equations as outlined in Pearl [9].2
5 Results for four systems on alternating weeks
As we mentioned earlier, the burden of analysis in sandbox testing shifts to the design of the
experiment and analysis of results. Since we can control a resource by only one method at any
given instance of time, both are serious issues. The results we describe below are actually for a test
comparing four dierent RM methods, the incumbent system, prototype, and two dierent systems
from two vendors. The general idea is to compare revenue performance (revenue per available seat)
2There is an alternate denition of causality based on predictability, called Granger causality [5], that has found
acceptance in econometrics but we discard as inapplicable in our context.
8for this year compared to the same week the year prior.
5.0.6 Diculties
The main problem with analyzing data is that there could be large dierences across weeks, for the
same ight. Even though the initial idea was that such unidentied variations would average out
by running it for a suciently long period of time for alternate weeks, it so turned out that even
9 months of testing, divided over four controls gives only 9 weeks of data for each, and this is not
suciently large to average out inter-week dierences. Alternate weeks are reasonably close to be
comparable, but two ight-days four weeks apart are just not comparable as there is a fundamental
dierence in the underlying demand.
This forces one to bring in the comparable week the year prior to minimize the dierences
between weeks. As one can see from the data, this greatly reduces out the variance (thus explaining
the dierence), but there are problems still. Even taking ratios of revenue over comparable weeks
(shifted 52 weeks prior), for apparently no identiable reason|no change in the control, competitive
landscape, or ight timings, or events falling dierently|there is signicant variance. One could
only attribute these changes to two things: a dierent macroeconomic landscape, or a dierent price
structure, especially as prices change frequently in the airline industry.
Of course, there could be identiable reasons also. For the ights in question the competitor
ights were exactly the same, and there were only minor shifts in the ight timings. However,
some major holidays, such as Easter weekend (which was the only such for this test period), fall
on dierent days each year, and have to be accounted for. Our solution is to delete such weekends
entirely from the test and compare performance during that week in isolation, separately.
Year-over-year comparison is standard in the industry (in all businesses in fact), and hence
likely to be accepted by management, so this is one reason we made this choice. However, in a
rapidly changing industry with frequently changing price structures, such comparison is fraught
with diculties, and one has to make a careful analysis of the results.
It so turns out that testing over all the ights in a market is not valuable as it is very dicult
to extract the natural inter-week variation compared to the prior year. The markets where there
was at least one control ight which had the same incumbent control throughout however captures
the inter-week variations. We compare the revenue performance of the test ight vs. a control
ight which was experiencing the same demand variations (compared to the year prior for the same
day) and hence comparable. (This however raises some questions of cannibalization that we address
shortly.)
Although the results are not the point of the paper, we state them below to show how the
perspective can change with a raw comparison vs. a comparison with a control ight during the
same week.
5.0.7 Results
In Table 1 we give the revenue performance for the total periods controlled by each one of the
methods. It appears there are big dierences in revenue performance, and if one looks carefully,
load factors as well as average fares. All the methods have gained, including the incumbent method.
This could be attributed to a general improvement in the markets or changes in the price structure.
9Current year: Incumbent System 0 System 1 System 2
Capacity (seats) 177,145 195,059 156,656 195,059
Demand (pax) 121,991 128,856 105,244 130, 589
LF (%) 68.9 66.1 67.2 66.9
Avg. Fare (e) 88.2 89.9 84.6 88.8
Revenue (1000 e) 10,757 11,587 8,908 11,592
Avg. rev/seat (e) 60.7 59.4 56.9 59.4
Year prior:
Capacity (seats) 178,900 197,050 158,240 197,050
Demand (pax) 105,685 113,828 89,496 116,024
LF (%) 59.1 57.8 56.6 58.9
Avg. Fare (e) 88.3 89.1 85.0 91.1
Revenue (1000 e) 9,334 10,147 7,610 10,568
Avg. rev/seat (e) 52.2 51.5 48.1 53.6
Var. Avg. rev/seat (%) 16.4 15.4 18.3 10.8
Table 1: Revenue results compared to the year prior for incumbent, prototype and two other systems.
However, taking into account the variation of the rest of the ights on the routes (the numbers
are only for markets where at least one ight was controlled by the incumbent system throughout)
the numbers, in Table 2, paint a dierent picture. The variation across the dierent systems has
Incumbent System 0 System 1 System 2
Var. Avg. rev/seat (%) 16.4 15.4 18.3 10.8
Var. Avg. rev/seat (%) 14.2 9.4 16.5 9.6
ights out of the trial
Dierential rev/seat gain 2.2 6.0 1.8 1.2
Table 2: Revenue results compared to the out-of-trial ights in the same markets.
moderated somewhat. The ight that was out of the test during the same week also experienced an
improvement in revenue by a signicant amount. This ight captures all the unidentied changes
in the demand.
Note that only the incumbent system had manual attention. All others were nearly completely
automated.
5.0.8 Cannibalization
The natural question that arises, when comparing against a within-week out-of-trial control ight is
the role played by cannibalization. It is quite plausible that the test method performed well because
it cannibalized demand from the airline's other ight during the day.
Cannibalization can take many forms, especially in the RM context. It can also be confused with
genuine market growth or demand stimulation. We therefore identify four forms of cannibalization
specic to RM.
101. Demand cannibalization: The test ight prices low and just takes away aggregate demand
from the out-of-trial ight. The easiest form to test.
2. Mix cannibalization: Demand apparently is unaected, load factor proportions are as before,
but the test ight alters the mix of the out-of-trial ight (Example: Test ight takes business
passengers and gives back leisure passengers to the out-of-trial ight).
3. Consumer surplus cannibalization: The test ight increases its demand by extracting more
consumer surplus.
4. Competition cannibalization: The test ight is stealing demand from the competition. In other
words, the demand increases comes from increasing market share (say in the time-band of the
test ight) rather than from the out-of-trial ight.
The last two forms of cannibalization do not really deserve to be called cannibalization (as they may
be seen as the objective of RM), but we include it here to identify the results. One can also dispute
the benets of the last form, competition cannibalization, as it might be detrimental in the long run.
It is quite possible also that the test ights are shifting demand across weeks. However, given
the alternatives, and as changing the day of travel is costly to the consumers, we discarded this
possibility in our testing.
Finally, one should not forget the possibility that the out-of-trial ight is actually cannibalizing
from the test ight, and the performance of the test ight would be higher under \normal" circum-
stances. This can happen for instance if the incumbent system is pricing the out-of-trial ight too
low and the test ight is seeing low demand because of this.
All these above points are to clarify the various possibilities, and to point out the diculties
of testing for cannibalization. Given the nature of the problem and the number of unobservable
factors, one can only provide statistical evidence that a certain phenomenon is, or is not, happening.
We outline next the nature of such statistical and econometric tests that we performed to analyze
the results.
6 Econometric and statistical analysis framework
Now, given the experiment and the results, we want to justify two things: (a) show that the in-
troduction of the new RM method or process caused the dierences in the results (b) identify
cannibalization, if any. For this reason, we need to specify the universe behind the experiment, some
baseline and causal assumptions, and the structural equations we believe are driving the results.
6.1 Universe and causal assumptions
Our universe begins with the notion of potential market demand. This is the total population that
has a a reasonable probability of wanting to take a ight in a given market on a particular day. We
assume (exogenously) that the market demand is independent across days and across markets. We
denote this (unobservable) market demand by Mt for day t. Within this demand there could be a
mix of dierent types (say with dierent willingness-to-pay for travel).
Mt is shared by the ights in the market. For simplicity (in describing the model) we assume
there are two ights of our airline each day (call them ight f and  f to stand for test ight and
11Figure 2: Inuence of a new RM system on demand over \normal" demand for a set of daily ights.
out-of-trial ight respectively), and a bunch of competing ights that we group together as a single
alternative c. Like wise, let w represent a week when both the ights are controlled by the same
incumbent system, and  w represent a week where one of the ights was controlled by an alternate
system (we can make the index by day, but we use weeks as units for simplicity). We refer to them
as normal week and test week respectively.
Under \normal" circumstances, say with an incumbent system and process under steady-state,
we represent Dt as the daily demand that our airline sees. So this is the fraction of the market
demand the airline captures on any given day. Compared to this \normal" demand scenario, a new
\treatment", that is a new RM system changes either the mix of the demand, stimulates or restrains
the demand.
Our causal assumption is that a RM system or process inuences the overall demand that a
particular ight sees as well as the mix of the demand that it sees. This assumption is illustrated
in Figure 2 assuming a new RM system controls all the ights in the market. So a new RM system
can potentially improve (or decrease) revenues, while keeping the same load factors.
Our assumption about system performance (measured say by revenue per available seat) is that
it is caused by three factors: (i) underlying market demand, (ii) RM system or analyst skill in
extracting consumer surplus (changing the mix), and (iii) the RM process stimulating demand. The
rst factor is outside the control of the system and should be separated from underlying performance.
We want to identify the relative performance of a new system on f in its eective manipulation of the
second and third factors. A complication is that we also want to check if a new system is improving
to the detriment of the system controlling the out-of-trial ight  f.
We believe we cannot avoid keeping an out-of-trial ight as we need a control for the (unobserv-
able) underlying daily market demand.
6.2 Structural Equations
An econometric model has to be suciently detailed to capture the eects of factors we are interested
in (such as system performance and cannibalization) and at the same time parsimonious enough to
be estimable from observed data. With this in mind, we make our model of demand and RM system
performance as simple as possible.
Let I represent observed RM system performance measure (revenue per available seat), and 
12true revenue management skill or performance. Then for two ights f and  f, the relationship is
given as
M  w = M  w 521  w (1)
I  wf = fM  w2  w (2)
I  w  f =   fM  w3  w (3)
where f represents the normal share and mix of the daily demand. We assume f +  f < 1, with the
understanding that competition takes a share of the rest of the market demand. These quantities
are of course highly dependent on the RM system controlling both the ights. One could break up
f into a demand factor and mix factor, but as we believe we cannot estimate them, at least with
this experiment, we combine them into one. The total performance of the system on a particular
ight then is f.
We are not interested in the values of the parameters per se, but rather, whether, if we introduce
a new RM system for ight f, does it change   f by a signicant amount. So the role of f is to
capture ight specic demand and mix.3
Equation (1) represents the evolution of the market demand.4 We assume it is linked to the
demand of the same week of the prior year (52 weeks prior, represented by t   52). The 's are
(multiplicative) random errors.
So now, suppose we introduce, during a certain week w, a new RM system on ight f. The
equations for this week would change to:
Mw = Mw 521w (4)
Iwf = 0
0
fMw2w (5)
Iw  f = 
0
 fMw3w (6)
So, the new control can potentially aect the 's (possibly increasing the share compared to the
competition).
The cannibalization question now is whether 
0
 f is signicantly dierent from   f. Once we resolve
this question in the negative, we can then ask the performance comparison question: whether 0
0
f
is signicantly dierent from f. If the rst question is positive, the results would be inconclusive,
at least when 
0
 f <   f .
6.3 Heuristic Justication
In Talluri et al. [14] we estimate the simultaneous dynamic equations (5) and (6) using tools from
econometrics. In this paper, we only give a heuristic argument to justify the performance comparison
made in Table 2. Our intention here is to show also why the system is estimable in the rst place,
and also bring out an important assumption we are making on the underlying demand.
3For instance, business passengers might prefer a early morning ight and would not shift easily to an afternoon
ight, so a morning ight might always have higher RM performance measure even though load factors are the same
and both ights are controlled by the same system.
4One can make this more complicated, but as this equation captures seasonality eects we believe it is sucient
for our purposes. We remove all data points if the week this year or the prior year has major identiable events, such
as Easter.
13We work with logarithms of the equations and compare the equations pairwise ignoring all error
terms. Comparing Equation (2) vs. Equation (3)
ln(
I  wf
I  w  f
) = ln(
f
  f
)
and comparing Equation (5) with Equation (6)
ln(
Iwf
Iw  f
) = ln(
0

) + ln(

0
f
  f
)
and Equation (2) with Equation (5)
ln(
I  wf
Iwf
) = ln(

0) + ln(
f

0
f
) + ln(
M  w
Mw
): (7)
To eliminate the last term we compare Equation (1) with Equation (4) for this year and the year
prior
ln(
M  w
Mw
) = ln(
M  w 52
Mw 52
) = ln(
I(  w 52)f
I(w 52)f
) (8)
where the last equality is from comparing Equation (2) with Equation (5) for the year prior. This
also brings to light an assumption that we are making in Equation (1): we are assuming that the
ratio of the total market demand over the weeks w and  w are the same for this year and the year
prior. We acknowledge that this is an important assumption, but is nevertheless weaker than saying
the demands are the same across years. We need it however so we can eliminate the ratio in each of
the terms using the prior year RM performance for the weeks.
Now the cannibalization question can be settled by comparing Equation (3) with Equation (6)
ln(
I  w  f
Iw  f
) = ln(
  f

0
 f
) + ln(
M  w
Mw
):
Once this is settled we can extract relative performance from Equation (7), comparing 0
0
f with
f.
While the above reasoning is heuristic, on an average basis, it is what lies behind the comparisons
in Tables (1) and (2) (without the cannibalization question). They can be seen as comparing
ln(
Iwf
I(w 52)f
) = ln(
0

) + ln(

0
f
f
) + ln(
Mw
Mw 52
)
and replacing ln( Mw
Mw 52) by its proxy ln(
Iw  f
I(w 52)  f ) assuming cannibalization has been checked to be
negligible.
The equations have to be estimated using daily data of course, and this is what we do (under
slightly more complicated dynamics) in Talluri et al. [14].
7 Final comments
In this paper we describe an experiment for testing RM performance on a set of live ights (sandbox
testing). With very few assumptions and in actual market conditions it evaluates the performance
14of a new system against an incumbent system. We make a case for not using simulations, especially
when involving competition and customer behavior and unpredictable events. We provide the back-
ground of the testing framework and the design of the experiment, that we hope would be useful for
practitioners contemplating a similar question. Finally, we provide a model of RM performance for
evaluating the results using dynamic structural equations.
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